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The United States and China began the 1990s with virtually no
bilateral relationship. After the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square,
Washington had suspended all defense contacts and military-related com-
merce with Beijing. By the end of the 1990s, the United States and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) had ridden the proverbial roller coaster,
with periods of intense dialogue and interaction coupled with times of pro-
found tension and alienation. Military ties, which displayed the greatest
volatility, remain one of the most intriguing dimensions of the Sino-U.S. re-
lationship. During the past five years of the George W. Bush administration,
military relations have lagged behind other elements of official state-to-
state ties. The reasons for this relative inactivity and caution in bilateral se-
curity interactions are complex, including a legacy of spy scandals, differences
in regional and global policy agendas, and the potential for a military clash
over Taiwan.
The Bush administration’s approach to military engagement with China
undoubtedly also reflects some of the lessons learned during President Bill
Clinton’s administration. Bounded on one side by the 1995–1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis and on the other by the May 1999 accidental bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, this period provides an instructive case study
on the impediments to securing and sustaining effective Sino-U.S. defense
ties. From 1995 to 1999, senior U.S. civilian and military officials worked to
create an integrated framework for security engagement with Beijing. Sev-
eral events drove this endeavor, which initially enjoyed broad bipartisan and
l Campbell & Weitz
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY  WINTER 2005-06170
expert support in Washington. First, a series of near clashes occurred be-
tween forward-deployed U.S. naval forces and units of the Chinese navy.
These incidents demonstrated to U.S. commanders the need to negotiate
rules of the road for military operations in the western Pacific. Second, se-
nior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials persistently complained to
their Washington counterparts about U.S.
military aircraft flying precariously close to
Chinese airspace. They claimed these flights
deliberately sought to expose various Chi-
nese air defense systems and protocols.
Third, the heightened tensions resulting
from China’s provocative military moves
during the Taiwan Strait confrontation led
some in Washington to regret the lack of a
deeper defense dialogue before the crisis,
which would have helped communicate mu-
tual red lines. Finally, U.S. civilian and military leaders in the Pentagon
naturally wanted to pursue better relations with their Chinese counterparts,
given their country’s growing military reach. The objective never was en-
gagement for engagement’s sake. Instead, U.S. policymakers sought to con-
vince Chinese interlocutors of the correctness of the U.S. worldview on
such issues as military transparency, international law, and China’s need to
participate more actively in multilateral security institutions.
Despite the widely reported problems regarding transparency, reciprocity,
and espionage, these factors represented only some of the much more funda-
mental set of strategic misunderstandings that impeded realization of the
administration’s ambitious agenda for military engagement during the late
1990s. Why did both sides seek closer defense ties, and what were some of
the resulting agreements? What were the missed signals, faulty assumptions,
and strategic disparities that ultimately derailed efforts at Sino-U.S. military
engagement? Today, as the Bush administration modestly considers revitaliz-
ing military ties and with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to
China in October 2005, the first during his current tenure in office, most of
these lessons remain relevant. In particular, experience has shown that such
military contacts alone have little effect on the overall U.S.-Chinese rela-
tionship. Although some believe that defense engagement improves bilateral
relations, the Sino-U.S. experience shows that the inverse relationship is
more common. Military-to-military ties typically become significantly more
productive only after the broader bilateral relationship improves. The many
deep-rooted sources of tension that persist between the two countries today
suggest the need for modest expectations about near-term progress both in
military ties and broader relations.
Both sides believed
they could use
bilateral military ties
to shape the other’s
behavior.
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Promoting Sino-U.S. Military Cooperation
The U.S. and Chinese governments had several key motivations to improve
military contacts during the 1990s. They included fears, at least on the U.S.
side, that their forces could clash due to accidents or miscalculation; a de-
sire to shape the other government’s foreign and defense policies; hopes of
learning more about the other’s defense establishment and practices; and a
broad desire to leverage favorable developments in the East Asian security
environment.
AVOIDING MILITARY MISCALCULATIONS
The most pressing issue requiring enhanced military dialogue concerned
maritime security. Since the early 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) had been transitioning from a primarily coastal defense force into a
blue-water fleet that operated more often beyond Chinese territorial wa-
ters.1  As the PLAN entered areas regularly patrolled by U.S. warships, the
Department of Defense decided to pursue an accord, modeled after the
1972 U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, designed to reduce the risks
of an inadvertent maritime clash.2  Defense Department leaders believed
they could sell the PLA on the utility of such a confidence-building measure
(CBM) and that, at a minimum, a Sino-U.S. dialogue on these issues could
help avoid accidents and miscalculations between two navies that previ-
ously had rarely operated in proximity.
Several alarming maritime incidents spurred this U.S. (and subsequent
Chinese) interest in regularizing naval interactions. In July 1993, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency erroneously concluded that the Yinhe, a Chinese
container ship, was transporting banned chemicals to Iran. Despite Beijing’s
vigorous denials, U.S. warships and military aircraft monitored but did not
board the ship, which then was denied entry to a number of Persian Gulf
ports. After 20 days, the parties to the dispute worked out a compromise
through which Chinese and Saudi inspectors, advised by U.S. technical ex-
perts, examined the vessel. Finding it carried legitimate cargo, they allowed
the ship to proceed to its original destination. The incident evoked fierce
Chinese protests. Vice Premier Zou Jiahua said that the U.S. action violated
China’s sovereignty and freedom of navigation, inflicted major economic
losses, and harmed the PRC’s credibility.3  The Chinese government issued a
formal statement accusing the U.S. military of violating international law.4
A potentially more serious incident occurred between October 27 and
October 29, 1994, when the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and its ac-
companying battle group encountered a PLAN nuclear submarine in
the Yellow Sea. On detecting the vessel about 200 miles away off the
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Shandong peninsula, a region where PLAN submarines had rarely oper-
ated previously, U.S. S-3 aircraft dropped sonar buoys to track it. The
Chinese responded by scrambling warplanes to the scene. During the
tense three-day encounter, U.S. and Chinese fighter pilots repeatedly
flew within sight of each other. Although neither side publicized the in-
cident, PRC representatives reportedly told a U.S. military attaché in
Beijing that Chinese forces would “shoot to kill,” should a similar con-
frontation occur.5
INFLUENCING EACH OTHER’S POLICIES
Both Washington and Beijing believed they could use bilateral military-to-
military ties to shape the other’s behavior. The Clinton administration’s
policy of “comprehensive engagement,” which sought to make China a
constructive member of the international community, shaped its approach
toward the Chinese armed forces. As Defense Department officials ex-
plained to Congress, “The PLA is an important decisionmaker in the PRC,
and military engagement gives us the opportunity to affect the PLA’s deci-
sion-making calculus.”6  U.S. policymakers wanted to discourage Chinese
military commanders, who were then displaying increasing capabilities and
self-confidence, as well as China’s political leaders from underestimating
Washington’s capacity and commitment to uphold its security interests in
East Asia. Defense Secretary William Perry expounded on this logic in a
1994 then-secret memorandum. He justified the need to pursue compre-
hensive engagement, including the resumption of military contacts, on the
grounds that “China is fast becoming the world’s largest economic power,
and that combined with its UN P-5 status, its political clout, its nuclear
weapons, and a modernizing military, make China a player with which the
United States must work together.” Perry went on to explain that, to gain
China’s cooperation, “we must rebuild mutual trust and understanding
with the PLA, and this could only happen through high level dialogue and
working level contacts. … Let us proceed in a forward-looking, although
measured, manner in this important relationship.”7
Chinese leaders similarly perceived the U.S. military and its civilian com-
ponents as having a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. They appreciated
that the United States remained divided about how to deal with the PRC.8
Chinese officials apparently hoped that better military-to-military ties might
encourage Washington to adopt more favorable policies on such questions
as Taiwan, export controls, and military sales to China suspended since
1989. By engaging in military exchanges, moreover, the Chinese sought to
encourage the United States to see and treat the PLA as an equal partner.
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PROMOTING BILATERAL MILITARY TRANSPARENCY
Both the U.S. and Chinese defense communities had an interest in learning
more about each other. The Defense Department’s 1998 East Asian Strategy
Report (EASR) reflects the value that U.S. policymakers placed on enhanc-
ing security transparency: “Dialogue and exchanges can reduce misperceptions
between our countries, increase our understanding of Chinese security con-
cerns, and build confidence between our
two defense establishments to avoid mili-
tary accidents and miscalculations.”9  Dur-
ing his four-day visit to Beijing in October
1994, Perry explicitly told his hosts they
should make their military budget and plan-
ning more transparent to minimize misun-
derstandings.10  At this time, the PLA was
becoming more professional, acquiring bet-
ter indigenous and foreign military equip-
ment, and consciously trying to adopt the
best Western military practices.11  For example, Chinese officers showed
great interest in U.S. defense doctrines and manuals. Furthermore, they
hoped to understand their potential adversaries better and perhaps acquire
advanced U.S. military technology.12
RESPONDING TO A TRANSFORMED REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
During the 1990s, many Asia-Pacific countries took steps to develop bilat-
eral and, under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum, regional security cooperation and CBMs.13  In this context,
China’s neighbors urged Beijing to make its own foreign and defense activi-
ties more transparent. The Chinese government responded by publishing its
first security White Paper in 1995 and its first defense White Paper in 1998.14
China also negotiated a number of bilateral CBMs with its neighbors, most
prominently with all four adjoining former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In July 1994, the Chinese and Russian
defense ministers adopted a set of practices to forestall military incidents. In
April 1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot line,
Beijing’s first with another government.15  Beginning with the April 1996
Shanghai Treaty, China also signed several operational arms control agree-
ments that imposed restrictions on conventional military deployments and
activity within a 100-kilometer-wide demilitarization zone along mutual
frontiers with its four former Soviet neighbors. In addition, Beijing made
joint security declarations or established consultative security mechanisms
Differing perceptions
of the value of
transparency
contributed to the
lack of reciprocity.
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with Australia, Japan, and other Asian countries.16  Seeing that Chinese
leaders, given the proper conditions, were prepared to negotiate CBMs with
other governments, U.S. policymakers sought their own bilateral security
agreements with Beijing.
AGREEMENTS REACHED
In its approach toward China, Washington sought to model its military-to-
military contacts on the U.S.-Soviet experience of the late Cold War. In par-
ticular, U.S. policymakers attempted to draw on CBMs such as the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 1989 U.S.-Soviet Prevention of Dan-
gerous Military Incidents Agreement and apply them to its emerging defense
relationship with China. This strategy seemed reasonable. Russian-U.S. mili-
tary ties were flourishing at the time, especially between the U.S. Pacific
Command and the Russian Far East.17  Furthermore, U.S. hopes were bol-
stered by China’s pursuit of CBMs with Russia and other countries, some of
which also resembled the earlier U.S.-Soviet CBMs.18
Washington considered the January 1998 Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA) its most important bilateral CBM with China. The
MMCA aimed to promote a defense dialogue to avoid misunderstandings
between U.S. and Chinese naval and air forces operating near one another.
Working group meetings discussed such issues as communication between
ships and aircraft, an urgent topic for two militaries that until then had
rarely made direct contact in the course of their normal operations.19  Com-
pared with the original U.S.-Soviet agreement, however, the MMCA was
vaguer, lacking the detailed “rules of the road” provisions found in the ear-
lier accord.
The Defense Consultative Talks, annual bilateral meetings between se-
nior defense officials and officers that began in December 1997, represented
another important CBM. Members of the Chinese and U.S. defense commu-
nities also expanded their visits to each other’s facilities, where they re-
ceived briefings on military doctrine, law, medicine, and other topics.20
Further functional exchanges occurred through the two countries’ military
educational institutions. During Clinton’s visit to Beijing in June 1998, both
sides agreed to allow observers to attend some of each other’s military exer-
cises. Chinese defense representatives subsequently attended the Rim of the
Pacific and Cope Thunder exercises, and a senior U.S. delegation observed a
PLA exercise in the Nanjing Military Region.21  Another product of Clinton’s
June 1998 visit was a bilateral agreement not to target strategic nuclear
weapons at each other. The 1998 EASR describes the measure as “an impor-
tant symbolic action that reassured both sides and reaffirmed our construc-
tive relationship.” The agreement was largely symbolic, however, lacking
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enforcement or verification measures. More meaningful was the direct com-
munications link, or hotline, established between the U.S. and Chinese
presidents in May 1998.
Finally, the Clinton administration considered bilateral military coopera-
tion on environmental and humanitarian mat-
ters as potential CBMs. According to the 1998
EASR, “through this mechanism trust is es-
tablished that may lead to easing of tensions
and better understanding of different military
cultures.” In September 1998, Defense Secre-
tary William S. Cohen and Zhang Wannian,
the Chinese Central Military Commission vice
chairman, signed a joint statement authoriz-
ing bilateral military exchanges on environ-
mental cooperation. Chinese and U.S. defense
officials also discussed humanitarian issues such as disaster relief during
some exchanges.
What Went Wrong
Between 1995 and 1999, the Clinton administration undertook an ambi-
tious and sustained effort to engage the Chinese military on a wide range of
important security topics. The Chinese government also seemed interested
in deepening military-to-military ties. Nevertheless, a combination of fac-
tors prevented significantly improving defense relations, including a per-
ceived lack of reciprocity, unrelated developments in the Sino-U.S. political
relationship, mutual suspicions about intentions and behavior, and asymme-
tries in the two militaries’ capabilities and operational practices.
LACK OF RECIPROCITY
The growing sentiment within the United States about a perceived lack of
reciprocity in defense relations represented the most visible impediment to
deepening bilateral military ties. Prominent Americans increasingly com-
plained that, although the United States sought substantive dialogues and
concrete agreements while providing Chinese representatives with detailed
briefings, copious publications, and special access to a diverse range of mili-
tary facilities, the PLA made mostly symbolic gestures in return, taking U.S.
visitors to tourist sites and Potemkin villages while organizing vacuous lec-
tures on general topics. In a speech before the PLA National Defense Uni-
versity in May 1997, General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S.
Bilateral defense
ties suffered from
Chinese officers’
limited knowledge
and autonomy.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for “a more equal exchange of information with
the PLA.”22  Chinese representatives claimed that they could not fully recip-
rocate U.S. initiatives because some of their units were embarrassingly back-
ward, the PLA had only limited funds for such exchanges, and excessive
transparency could expose Chinese military vulnerabilities to a potential for-
eign adversary.23  One analyst argues that the main difference is that the
PLA cares most about whom they see, while
Defense Department leaders value most what
they see.24  Although U.S. critics of the un-
equal exchange claimed that PLA represen-
tatives gained better access to U.S. military
doctrine, technology, and facilities, U.S. de-
fenders of the contacts argued they brought
value to both sides despite the asymmetry.25
Differing perceptions of the value of trans-
parency contributed to this lack of reciprocity.
The United States valued military transpar-
ency as a means to avoid miscalculation and promote trust, but many Chinese
strategists saw uncertainty, or the absence of transparency, as bolstering de-
terrence.26  During the 1990s, although Chinese civilian analysts based in
nonmilitary think tanks generally showed appreciation of the utility of mili-
tary transparency, most government officials and PLA leaders did not.27  The
official adherence to preserving uncertainty appears to have set the founda-
tion for Beijing’s initial opposition to efforts to expand military transpar-
ency. Instead, these strategists advocated the value of issuing mutual
declaratory statements about countries’ peaceful intentions.28  They also re-
sisted repeated U.S. attempts to make China’s arms exports more transpar-
ent.29  Beijing’s reluctance to remove uncertainties had perhaps its greatest
impact on U.S.-led efforts to cultivate ties with China’s nuclear weapons es-
tablishment. Because of Beijing’s opposition, efforts at such a strategic dia-
logue, which had proven exceptionally profitable in the Soviet case, failed
almost entirely. Besides a general lack of enthusiasm for enhancing military
transparency, the Chinese likely did not want to draw attention to their
strategic buildup and feared exposing vulnerabilities to a potential foe, par-
ticularly given Washington’s plans to develop ballistic missile defenses.
MILITARY ASYMMETRIES
Beyond these doctrinal differences, Sino-U.S. bilateral defense ties suffered
from Chinese officers’ limited knowledge and autonomy. Many senior PLA
commanders during the 1990s showed a lack of understanding of the intri-
cacies of global politics. They had spent the bulk of their careers in regional
External political
shocks repeatedly led
one side or the other
to suspend military
contacts.
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field commands in China’s interior and had had little contact with foreign-
ers.30  Beijing’s policy since the 1960s of not entering into formal military al-
liances meant that few in the PRC defense community had participated in
combined training exercises with other countries.31  Ironically, their limited
knowledge did not matter much for foreign military relations because their
political leaders kept them on a short leash. For example, the civilians’ de-
termination to retain control of crisis communications wrecked attempts
by the commander in chief of the Pacific Command to codify a more formal
line of emergency communication with Chinese military officers.
Other asymmetries limited the applicability of the lessons learned from
the U.S.-Soviet experience regarding defense engagement and CBMs to the
U.S.-Chinese interaction. Whereas Soviet and U.S. military forces operated
and had the potential to clash throughout the world, Chinese forces still re-
mained close to their home territory. If anything, U.S. forces began to oper-
ate even more extensively in China’s vicinity following the Cold War’s end.
U.S. submarines and reconnaissance flights, such as with the EP-3, con-
ducted missions very close to the mainland, probing for reactions and weak-
nesses. Furthermore, U.S. carrier battle groups plied the disputed waters of
the South China Sea, often raising consternation in Beijing. Asymmetries in
the two sides’ military operations complicated attempts to negotiate bilat-
eral CBMs. Chinese officials rejected measures that would have endorsed
operating practices that codified U.S. advantages. Although the two parties
ultimately negotiated the MMCA, it merely created a mechanism for regular
meetings between their navies. It did not place restrictions on military prac-
tices or specify procedures to govern how the two sides would interact if
problems arose.
During the 1980s, the Soviet and U.S. militaries appeared to have ap-
proximately equivalent capabilities. In the 1990s, both Beijing and Washing-
ton recognized that U.S. forces were superior to Chinese forces, often by
orders of magnitude, in weaponry, training, and systems integration. Given
the profound power differential, Beijing could ill afford a direct military
competition with Washington. Chinese officials therefore also wanted to
avoid having the United States view them as a potential Soviet-type military
antagonist, leading them to reject exchanges based explicitly on the East-
West model. Another asymmetry lay in the apparently divergent trajectories
of their power relationships. U.S.-Soviet CBMs and military contacts made
the most progress during the Mikhail Gorbachev era (1985–1991), when
most Soviet civilian and military leaders understood that they governed a
country whose power was declining vis-à-vis the United States. In contrast,
Chinese officials saw themselves as leaders of an ascending military power.
Accordingly, they might have felt reluctant to freeze the status quo when
asymmetries in military operations favored the United States. Similar con-
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siderations appear to have motivated Beijing to abstain from negotiating
reductions in nuclear forces. Chinese representatives have always publicly
insisted that their involvement in the strategic arms reduction process
would await much deeper cuts in the superior nuclear arsenals of Russia
and the United States. In the cases of structural and operational arms con-
trol, China might have anticipated acquiring a better bargaining position
over time.32
MUTUAL SUSPICIONS
Compounding these complications, the United States and the PRC each re-
mained suspicious of the other’s true objectives and behavior. Whereas
Washington feared the Chinese were exploiting contacts to acquire military
secrets, Beijing worried that the Clinton administration, for all its talk of
engagement, ultimately hoped to subvert Chinese communism. Chinese
leaders presumably felt especially threatened by the Clinton administration’s
public desire to transform China into a Western-style democracy. In their
writings, PLA analysts interpreted the administration’s commitment to en-
gagement as merely a refined form of “soft containment.”33  Attacks in Con-
gress and the media on the PRC’s human rights, commercial, and other
policies likely reinforced Chinese suspicions regarding U.S. intent. Despite
Washington’s best efforts, they probably interpreted the U.S. decisions to
maintain its Cold War troop levels in East Asia, strengthen security ties with
Japan, and back Taiwan in its confrontations with China as means of limit-
ing the PRC’s regional influence.34
Beijing singled out Washington’s military alliance with Japan as an object
of concern. Since World War II, China had traditionally feared a revival of
Japanese military strength under U.S. auspices, either through direct U.S.
support or through a combination of Japanese craftiness and U.S. naïveté.
Chinese leaders now worried that, with the demise of the Soviet threat, the
alliance would be directed against them.35  Chinese concerns became in-
creasingly evident after the Clinton administration began to revitalize the
U.S.- Japanese security partnership. In September 1997, Japan and the
United States released a set of revised defense guidelines that provided for
greater military cooperation during a crisis “in areas surrounding Japan.”36
After North Korea launched a Taepo-dong missile over Japan in August
1998, the two governments also began to collaborate more on theater ballis-
tic missile defenses. Chinese representatives feared that these initiatives
would encourage a joint U.S.-Japanese military response to any future re-
gional crisis, including one involving Taiwan.
Although increasingly opposed to Washington’s formal military alliances
with Japan and other Asian countries, the Chinese most strongly contested
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U.S. defense ties with Taiwan. Throughout the 1990s, Chinese representa-
tives evinced alarm about the growth of pro-independence sentiment on the
island. Beijing believed that Washington and Tokyo were encouraging sepa-
ratist forces and impeding Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Taiwan
was no longer a formal U.S. military ally, but the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
had reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to sell arms to Taiwan and take
other steps to preserve the military balance
across the strait. In a counterproductive at-
tempt to discourage Taiwanese voters from
supporting pro-independence politicians, the
PLA conducted major military exercises, in-
cluding missile launches, amphibious exer-
cises, and live-fire demonstrations, in the
military districts opposite Taiwan in 1995 and
1996. In March 1996, the Clinton adminis-
tration responded by deploying the aircraft
carrier USS Independence and its battle group
near Taiwan. It also redeployed the USS Nimitz and its battle group from the
Persian Gulf to the seas near Taiwan. In the end, the Chinese backed down
and ended their threatening military activities.
Similar to other military confrontations, the Taiwan Strait crisis provided
incentives for and impeded the achievement of Sino-U.S. CBMs. Chinese
leaders complained bitterly about the U.S. military involvement and threat-
ened to attack any U.S. forces intervening on Taiwan’s behalf in the fu-
ture.37  Clinton reaffirmed his opposition to formal Taiwanese independence
during his visit to Shanghai in June 1998. Most Americans sympathized with
the Taiwanese, however, as long-standing U.S. partners and citizens of an
emerging democracy that was refuting widely held assumptions about the in-
compatibility of Asian, especially Chinese Confucian, and democratic val-
ues. For their part, Chinese leaders felt that the Clinton administration had
both precipitated the crisis by granting then-Taiwanese president Lee Teng-
hui a visa to visit the United States and then escalated matters by challeng-
ing Chinese efforts to preserve the status quo on the island. The confrontation
convinced many U.S. officials, fearing that Chinese misperceptions of the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan had contributed to the PRC’s aggressive stance dur-
ing the crisis, of the need for communication mechanisms and other CBMs
to avert future misunderstandings.38
The Chinese were certainly not alone in their suspicions of the other
side’s behavior and intentions. In the United States, both conservatives and
liberals complained that the administration was too eager to engage the
PLA, given Beijing’s poor record regarding human rights, nonproliferation,
The Bush team in
the Pentagon is
quietly exploring
areas of engagement
with the PLA.
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and other important issues. The so-called Blue Team, which sought to pub-
licize China as a threat, warned that the PLA was using the exchanges to
acquire valuable technologies or insights that they could exploit against the
United States or its allies.39  Following the report of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Com-
mercial Concerns with the People’s Republic
of China (the “Cox Committee”) and the
subsequent Wen Ho Li incident that seemed
to confirm the report’s accusations about
Chinese nuclear espionage, Congress explic-
itly directed in Section 1201 of the FY 2000
Defense Authorization Act that the secre-
tary of defense not authorize military con-
tacts that might give the PLA inappropriate
access to an itemized list of advanced U.S.
military capabilities. The bill also required the secretary of defense to submit
an annual report assessing China’s current and future military strength.40
THE STATE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
Against this background of profound mutual distrust, intermittent political
shocks in the relationship exerted a decisive impact on the state of the two
countries’ defense ties. Adverse political-military events, including the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 1997 U.S.-Japanese defense
guidelines revisions, have repeatedly derailed Sino-U.S. military engagement
and impeded both the consolidation of existing CBMs and the development
of new ones. External developments repeatedly led one side or the other to
suspend military contacts as a form of signaling or retaliation, in effect hold-
ing them hostage to the larger political relationship. Ironically, although cri-
ses spur interest in CBMs, they also make them more difficult to achieve.
U.S. military ties with China often have served as the proverbial canary
in the coalmine, acutely vulnerable to harmful changes in their environ-
ment. The record bears out the Chinese assessment that progress in de-
fense transparency and other military-to-military ties requires corresponding,
if not prior, improvements in political relations between countries.41  A
PLA officer astutely remarked that CBMs indicate confidence as well as
contribute to it.42  Chinese leaders insisted at the time that, as long as the
United States viewed the PRC as a potential adversary or strategic com-
petitor, significant military ties could not develop between the two coun-
tries, although the same logic requires the Chinese to alter their negative
views of the United States. China’s experiences with the United States in
the 1980s and Russia in the 1990s also support the conclusion that better
Expectations about
near-term progress
in military ties should
be modest.
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security ties follow rather than precede improvements in underlying politi-
cal relations.43
A cursory review of Sino-U.S. relations during the 1990s underscores
how the overall relationship affected military ties. In particular, both sides
saw curtailing military exchanges as a readily available means to signal dis-
pleasure with some other aspect of the overall relationship. One obvious ex-
ample was the collapse of defense ties at the beginning of the decade,
following the Tiananmen Square massacre. Only after Chas W. Freeman Jr.,
the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, visited
China in October 1993 did bilateral military-to-military contacts resume.44
The dialogue deepened following the Yinhe incident, the Perry memo, Perry’s
visit to China in 1994, and the 1994 crisis over North Korea’s nuclear pro-
gram. The dialogue then stalled during the 1995–1996 crisis in the Taiwan
Strait. Bilateral military engagement reached a high point following the
October 1997 and June 1998 summit meetings between Clinton and then–
Chinese president Jiang Zemin. The report of the 1998–1999 Cox Commit-
tee and the May 1999 accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade then led to the mutual curtailment of almost all military contacts
for several years.45  The April 2001 crisis resulting from the collision be-
tween a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a PLA warplane in in-
ternational airspace near China’s Hainan Island reinforced the Bush
administration’s disinclination to resume widespread military exchanges, a
policy that only changed after the September 11 attacks diverted attention
in Washington from China’s rise as a potential unfriendly regional hegemon
to the immediate challenge of defending the United States against further
terrorist attacks.
Lowered Expectations and Results
The Bush team in the Pentagon is quietly exploring areas of engagement
with the PLA, but these initiatives are likely to be modest and based on a
more literal interpretation of reciprocity between the two sides. Contacts
will largely be restricted to more senior and seasoned military officers and
civilian Pentagon officials with deeper Asia backgrounds and responsibili-
ties. There will, however, be continuing vigilance against exposing visiting
Chinese military officials to high-technology U.S. systems and more sophis-
ticated operational techniques. The result is likely to be a wary, lower-level
engagement between the uniformed elite designed primarily to “check the
box,” as one close associate of Rumsfeld confided. Clearly, no breakthroughs
are in store, but there also will be less angst as some uniformed links be-
tween the two Pacific giants are at least nominally established.
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The second Clinton administration tried to overcome the problems it
faced by lowering its expectations and gradually redirecting the focus of its
military-to-military policy toward China from one that emphasized engage-
ment to one that reaffirmed the importance of deterring undesirable Chi-
nese behavior. Initially, U.S. officials sought to transform the relationship
into one in which Beijing and Washington cooperated to promote regional
security while managing their serious differ-
ences over nonproliferation, democracy, and
other issues. Given the influence of active
and former military officers in government,
business, and other Chinese institutions, U.S.
policymakers saw military-to-military rela-
tions as an essential component of such a
transformation.
Unfortunately, Chinese military leaders
experienced serious contradictions in their
relations with the United States. On one
hand, dealing directly with their U.S. counterparts gave them prestige, both
within China and internationally. It also provided opportunities to learn
about U.S. military doctrine and practices and possibly to persuade Wash-
ington to reconsider permitting the sale of U.S. weapons and military tech-
nology to China. On the other hand, the PLA’s senior leaders often manifested
a visceral distrust of the United States. They saw Washington as the main
impediment to China either reacquiring Taiwan or assuming its rightful
place as East Asia’s leading power. Furthermore, because highlighting a U.S.
threat helped sustain robust defense spending, the Chinese military had an
institutional incentive to sustain an unfriendly relationship.
Given that these latter considerations weighed more heavily on the Chi-
nese side, the Clinton administration soon realized that, despite its best ef-
forts, Sino-U.S. military relations would remain problematic. In addition,
beginning with the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, concerns grew within the
United States, especially in Congress, about the overall direction of rela-
tions with Beijing. As a result, the objective of deterrence, never absent, as-
sumed an even more prominent role in determining policy in Washington. In
particular, U.S. officials vigorously attempted to disabuse Chinese military and
political leaders of any belief that the United States was in invariable decline
or lacked the will or capacity to counter adventurism. Such misperceptions
had been evident in some Chinese writings and speeches and may have con-
tributed to the PRC’s aggressive stance during the Taiwan Strait crisis.46
The administration’s revised, post-1996 approach appears to have been
broadly successful. Beijing refrained from directly confronting Washington
Progress in military
confidence-building
will follow, not lead,
better political
relations.
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over Taiwan, nonproliferation, or other issues. The decisive U.S. victory, un-
der NATO’s auspices, in the 1999 Kosovo campaign reinforced and ampli-
fied to Beijing the lesson of the overwhelming U.S. military triumph during
the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War: the PLA should avoid direct conflict
with the U.S. armed forces. Chinese leaders and commentators stopped as-
suming that the “correlation of forces,” a Communist term for an expanded
notion of the balance of power, was rapidly and invariably moving in China’s
favor. The Chinese government refocused its energies on domestic eco-
nomic reconstruction.
Since 1999, U.S.-Chinese military contacts have largely atrophied except
for the occasional high-level visit. The Bush administration has tended to
see Beijing in more adversarial terms than its predecessors, discouraging it
from attempting to reinvigorate bilateral defense ties. Military contacts have
resumed in recent years, but never with the high expectations and admit-
tedly modest achievements of the late 1990s. Rumsfeld continues to require
his personal approval for each exchange with the PLA, reflecting his con-
cern and desire to keep the military-to-military program, which is still con-
troversial in Congress, under tight control. The most recent Defense
Department report on Chinese military power clearly articulates current
U.S. anxieties about PRC military spending and strategic objectives.47  In ad-
dition, PLA threats regarding U.S. policies toward Taiwan and Defense
Department criticisms of China’s missile buildup across the Taiwan Strait
highlight that deterrence still weighs heavily in the relationship.
Although many reasons contribute to today’s insubstantial defense dia-
logue, the lessons learned from the perceived failures and unfulfilled expec-
tations of the 1995–1999 period are perhaps the most important. Both sides
now recognize that the obstacles to better Sino-U.S. military ties involve
more than just personalities or disagreements over particular issues. Instead,
they reflect serious structural impediments that cannot easily be overcome.
Today, although the overall Sino-U.S. relationship is satisfactory, the mili-
tary-to-military dimension is largely missing. Yet, given the difficulties that
invariably plague this area, the absence might not represent much of a prob-
lem. Indeed, it may reflect a mature recognition that progress in military
confidence-building and related security ties will follow, not lead, improve-
ments in the other facets of this very complex bilateral relationship.
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